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SUMMARY
In December 2008 the European Union (EU) adopted 
political guidelines introducing measures to combat 
intangible transfers of technology (ITT), including 
mechanisms for cooperation in terms of consular vigilance. 
United Nations Security Council resolutions concerning 
Iran and North Korea further prohibit EU member states 
from ITT to these countries of concern. This paper deals 
with two key aspects of ITT: foreign nationals interested in 
sensitive disciplines and uncontrolled outflows of sensitive 
knowledge. Current export control and visa-screening 
procedures raise concerns with regard to WMD 
proliferation and there are gaps in the existing framework. 
The paper provides a number of recommendations for 
closing the gaps in terms of consular vigilance, visa-
screening procedures and awareness raising in scientific 
communities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The European Union (EU) has identified the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
and their means of delivery as a growing threat to 
European and international security.1 The discovery 
of illegal nuclear, chemical and biological weapon 
programmes in the recent past, in most cases supported 
by international supply networks, has underlined 
the continued risk of proliferation. The possible 
access by terrorist groups to such weapons adds a 
critical dimension to the threat. New technologies 
whose security implications are as yet unclear are 
continuously being developed and the globalization 
of information, goods, expertise and technology 
intensifies.2 
Looking over the horizon the risk of proliferation 
may increase further if present plans are realized. More 
countries are exploring the potential for nuclear energy 
to meet electricity demand while maintaining low 
carbon emissions. Sensitive know-how and technology 
used in civil nuclear projects, with the dual-use 
potential for use in nuclear weapon programmes, may 
be shared among a greater number of states—states 
that are diverse in terms of safety standards, 
transparency, governance and threat perceptions. 
Nuclear proliferation has advanced as a consequence of 
1  Council of the European Union, ‘Council conclusions on the new 
lines for action by the European Union in combating the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems’, 17172/08, 
Brussels, 13 Dec. 2008, p. 3, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/118434.pdf>.
2  Council of the European Union, ‘Fight against the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction: EU Strategy against Proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction’, 15708/03, 10 Dec. 2003, <http://ue.eu.
int/uedocs/cmsUpload/st15708.en03.pdf>; and European Council, ‘A 
secure Europe in a better world: European Security Strategy’, 78367/03, 
12 Dec. 2003, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-
defence/european-security-strategy?lang=en>.
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the technological progress in Western industrialized 
countries, which have expanded through legal trade 
with, or the illicit manufacture of replicas to, other 
parts of the world.3
Nuclear energy ambitions are not necessarily of 
direct proliferation concern, especially if sensitive 
technologies are not pursued. However, views on 
whether an increase in the number of power reactors 
around the world poses an increase in nuclear 
proliferation dangers differ.4
Advances in biological sciences may also increase 
the potency of biological weapons and bioterrorism. 
In addition to natural and accidental outbreaks, 
the increasing number of high-level containment 
laboratories and evolving technologies in the life 
sciences pose risks, including the dissemination of 
dangerous pathogens or toxins by bioterrorists or 
other actors. Today, many of the laboratories handling 
infectious agents are insufficiently protected and the 
associated security risks may not be fully realized.5 
A large chemical industry could also potentially 
contribute to proliferation. Although the verification 
system established by the 1993 Chemical Weapons 
Convention has been successful in this respect, the 
design is now close to 20 years old and the chemical 
industry has gone through significant changes in 
structure and management since the regime was 
created. These changes in the chemical industry and 
the introduction of new production technologies 
have so far had limited consequences for the effective 
functioning of the verification system. It is, however, 
critical to continue to monitor the development of the 
chemical industry closely and take actions to adapt the 
3  De Salazar, G.,  ‘El desarrollo de la energía nuclear y los riesgos 
de proliferación: el caso de Irán’ [The development of nuclear energy 
and proliferation risks: the case of Iran], Real Instituto Elcano, ARI 
156/2010, Madrid, 29 Oct. 2010, p. 6, <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.
org/wps/wcm/connect/240ad800447db76a995d9db769acd8f9/
ARI156-2010_Salazar_energia_+proliferacion_nuclear_Iran.pdf?MOD
=AJPERES&CACHEID=240ad800447db76a995d9db769acd8f9>.
4  See Letts, M. and Cunningham, F., ‘The role of the civil nuclear 
industry in preventing proliferation and in managing the second nuclear 
age’, Paper prepared for the Second Meeting of the International 
Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, 
Washington, 13–15 Feb. 2009, <http://www.icnnd.org/Documents/
Letts_Industry.pdf>.
5  Council of the European Union, ‘Intervention by the EU Personal 
Representative on Non-Proliferation, Ms Annalisa Giannella’, 
International Workshop on Responding to the Alleged Use of 
Biological Weapons, Madrid, 16–18 June 2010, p. 3, <http://www.unog.
ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/2BFE7AE64510D286C125775F0
04B04EA/$file/Annalisa+Giannella.Assistance+and+coordination+thr
ough+the+EU.pdf>.
verification measures—including the scope of facilities 
and chemicals subject to verification, data analysis and 
on-site inspection procedures—to the changing nature 
of the chemical industry. Yet, adopting the required 
legislative framework is only the beginning and must 
be accompanied by an effective enforcement and 
application of the system.6
Finally, the risk of radiological terrorism remains 
another concern: radioactive sources, for example in 
hospitals, are in many cases not properly secured and 
they could be used for radiological disperse devices—
the so-called ‘dirty bombs’.7
This paper explores a key aspect of controlling the 
illegal spread of sensitive technology which is often 
overlooked: the prevention of international ‘knowledge 
proliferation’—intangible transfers of technology 
(ITT)—with a focus on the EU. The paper explores how 
ITT is addressed in EU visa policy and puts forward 
a set of recommendations to the EU and its member 
states on the issue and in light of the implementation of 
the 2008 New Lines for Action.8
II. CONTROLLING SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY: THE 
EU APPROACH
In December 2003 the Council of the EU adopted the 
EU’s Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD Strategy) with the objective to 
prevent, deter, halt and where possible eliminate WMD 
proliferation programmes of concern worldwide.9 
6  Runn, P., ‘Report from Working Session 2: National Implementation 
and Industry Issues’, Seminar on the OPCW’s contribution to security 
and non-proliferation of chemical weapons, The Hague, 11–12 Apr. 2011, 
<http://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/events/2011/NPS/papers/
closing/Report_from_Working_Session_2.pdf>.
7  Conclusions of the International Workshop ‘New Lines for Action 
by the Europe Union in Combating the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction’, INCIPE, Madrid, 15 Dec. 2010, <http://www.incipe.org/
combatingmassdestructionweapons.html>. 
8  Council of the European Union, 17172/08 (note 1).
9  Council of the European Union (note 2), p. 1. For a detailed 
examination of the EU WMD Strategy, see Van Ham, P., ‘The European 
Union’s WMD Strategy and the CFSP: A Critical Analysis’, Non-
Proliferation Papers no. 2, Sep. 2011, <http://www.nonproliferation.
eu/documents/nonproliferationpapers/02_vanham.pdf>, p. 1. For 
background on the European non-proliferation policy and the domestic 
debate in the EU member states see Müller, H. (ed.), A European Non-
Proliferation Policy: Prospects and Problems (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 
1987); Müller, H. (ed.), A Survey of European Nuclear Policy, 1985-1987 
(Macmillan: London, 1989); Lomas, P. and Müller, H. (eds), Western 
Europe and the Future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (CEPS: 
Brussels, 1989); Müller, H. (ed.), How Western European Nuclear Policy Is 
Made: Deciding on the Atom (Macmillan: London, 1991); Müller, H. (ed.), 
European Non-Proliferation Policy, 1988-1992 (European Interuniversity 
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transfers of knowledge and know-how, including 
mechanisms of cooperation in terms of consular 
vigilance; (d) efforts to impede proliferation flows and 
sanction acts of proliferation; (e) financial supervision; 
and ( f ) coordination or collaboration with, and 
contribution to, relevant regional and international 
organizations.13 The New Lines for Action were 
adopted on the basis of a growing awareness in the 
EU that non-proliferation is a cross-cutting issue that 
affects a broad range of policy fields.
However, EU institutions and member states have 
not yet succeeded in implementing all the measures 
and the EU is still far from making non-proliferation 
a truly cross-cutting priority on the domestic agenda 
of its member states. For this reason, EU foreign 
ministers decided on 13 December 2010 to allow two 
more years for the implementation of the action plan.14 
The new deadline is December 2012 and at the end of 
2011 there was still a lot to do. Therefore, it is necessary 
to pay more attention to the domestic level and to 
strive towards greater coordination between relevant 
stakeholders at national and EU levels, in particular as 
regards ITT and visa screening in the EU.15 
The Council secretariat has reported some progress 
on these issues in the past couple of years. The Working 
Party on Non-Proliferation (CONOP) and the Working 
Party on Global Disarmament and Arms Control 
(CODUN) have established a list of disciplines in the 
scientific field identified as subjects of proliferation 
concern. CONOP delivered a presentation to the 
Working Party on Research in June 2010 to inform 
them of possible initiatives that could be taken under 
the New Lines for Action. COREPER has invited 
the Working Party on Research to examine further 
engagement in the field of scientific cooperation on 
the basis of the list of disciplines, such as exchanging 
best practices and creating awareness centres and 
contact points in universities. The Office of the EU 
representative on non-proliferation and disarmament 
has completed a survey on member states’ national 
policies and possible EU action to combat ITT of 
knowledge and know-how. The results of the survey 
were circulated to working groups in the field of non-
proliferation, disarmament, research, visa and consular 
cooperation in the first half of 2010, but they have not 
been made public (a follow-up is pending, for 2011–12). 
13  Council of the European Union (note 1), p. 5.
14  Council of the European Union (note 1), section 4.
15  Council of the European Union (note 1).
In terms of nuclear export controls, European 
suppliers have in the past been a source of concern 
for the non-proliferation regime. In fact, Europeans 
are still capable of supplying the full range of 
nuclear fuel cycle and dual-use facilities, equipment, 
material and technology and also help in critical 
weapons technology. As the project of a single market 
approached realization, it became obvious that 
regulations on dual-use transfers were a major political 
issue. It is thus no surprise that it took a long time to 
reach an agreement on an EU export control system, 
which entered into force in 1995.10 
In the common EU legislation only blueprints and 
software were included in the controlled category 
‘technology’ and documents (whether on paper or 
another medium such as a disk or tape) were treated 
like physical goods for purposes of export control. 
The question of how to control ITT—the knowledge 
contained in blueprints and software—was left for 
member states to resolve, with a declaration on the 
intent to reconsider its possible inclusion in the near 
future.11 However, the experience of certain cases has 
underlined that proliferators are often as interested 
in acquiring knowledge as they are physical items and 
that the traditional model of an export is only one of 
several pathways by which knowledge is passed. 
In December 2008 the EU adopted the ‘New Lines 
for Action by the EU in combating the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery 
systems’ to increase the effectiveness and impact of the 
EU WMD Strategy by achieving greater coordination 
within the EU and to make the EU strategic approach 
more operational.12 The document sets out a concrete 
list of measures that should be implemented by the 
European Commission, the Council of the EU and 
EU member states by the end of 2010. They include: 
(a) models for awareness raising for undertakings, 
scientific and academic circles, and financial 
institutions; (b) cooperation with third countries to 
help them to improve their non-proliferation policies 
and export controls; (c) measures to combat intangible 
Press: Brussels, 1993); and Müller, H. (ed.), European Non-Proliferation 
Policy, 1993-1995 (European Interuniversity Press: Brussels, 1996).
10  Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EC) 
no. 3381/94(2) of 19 Dec. 1994 setting up a Community regime for the 
control of exports of dual-use goods; and Council of the European 
Union, Council Decision 94/942/CFSP of 19 Dec. 1994 on the joint action 
concerning the control of exports of dual-use goods.
11  Müller, H. (ed.), Nuclear Export Controls in Europe (European 
Interuniversity Press: Brussels, 1995), pp. 14–15, 22.
12  Council of the European Union (note 1).
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check procedures and security vetting requirements 
within the industry dealing with high-risk chemical, 
biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials 
in order to identify gaps and good practices. This study 
should provide the necessary basis for assessing, among 
other things, the feasibility of common graduated 
criteria and the need to establish a system of mutual 
recognition of background checks and security vetting 
processes for certain categories of personnel, in order 
to implement recommendations for strengthening 
personnel security as set out in the EU CBRN Action 
Plan.21 The action plan also asks member states 
together with the Commission to encourage the 
chemical industry as well as professional and other 
relevant associations working on biological issues 
to develop and adopt codes of conduct concerning 
awareness of security-related issues for their members. 
The Commission is considering proposing a model code 
as part of the implementation of the EU CBRN Action 
Plan.
The Commission and EU member states exchange 
experiences of dual-use export controls by holding 
regular meetings of the so-called ‘Article 23 
Coordination Group’, which was established in order 
to examine questions concerning the application 
of dual-use regulation. Within the group, issues of 
tangible transfers of technology, goods and equipment 
may be discussed.22 The revised EU Dual-Use 
Regulation (2009) does not include a reference to 
specific criminal sanctions. However, the regulation 
requires member states to ‘lay down the penalties 
applicable to infringements of the provisions of 
the Dual-Use Regulation’. Those penalties must be 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive.23 In June 2011 
the Commission adopted a green paper on the EU dual-
use export control system, which launched a broad 
public consultation concerning the functioning of the 
system.24 In the same month the Commission launched 
21  Council of the European Union, ‘Council conclusions on 
strengthening chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) 
security in the European Union—an EU CBRN Action Plan’, 15505/1/09 
Rev. 1, Brussels, 12 Nov. 2009, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/
en/09/st15/st15505-re01.en09.pdf>, pp. 75–77.
22  Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EC) 
no. 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the 
control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items 
(recast), Article 23. 
23  Council of the European Union (note 22), Article 24.
24  European Commission, ‘The dual-use export control system of the 
European Union: ensuring security and competitiveness in a changing 
world’, Green Paper, COM (2011) 393 final, Brussels, 30 June 2011, 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/june/tradoc_148020.pdf>.
Several member states have reportedly taken measures 
to engage universities, research institutes and other 
actors and to raise their awareness of proliferation 
issues. The Commission is studying the possibility of 
organizing awareness-raising seminars for relevant 
stakeholders.16
Since 11 October 2011 the Visa Information System 
(VIS), for the exchange of data on short-stay visas 
among Schengen states, has been operational for one 
region.17 VIS is connected to national visa systems in 
Schengen via national interfaces to enable competent 
authorities to process data on visa applications and 
all visas that are issued, refused, annulled, revoked 
or extended. It allows border authorities to verify 
visa holders’ identities (by fingerprints) at the border 
crossing points in just a few seconds.18 The new system 
will facilitate the visa application procedure as well 
as consultation by member states’ authorities and 
Europol.19 The WMD Centre has invited the Council 
Visa Working Party to discuss further measures 
concerning EU cooperation on consular vigilance, 
such as raising the awareness of national visa-issuing 
authorities regarding proliferation risks. The survey 
conducted within CONOP has provided further ideas 
for discussion in terms of cooperation among member 
states and consular vigilance.20
In November 2010 the Commission launched a 
tender for a study concerning existing background 
16  Council of the European Union, Six-monthly progress report 
on the implementation of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction (2010/II), 17080/10, Brussels, 16 Dec. 2010, 
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st17/st17080.en10.
pdf>, p. 9; and Council of the European Union, Eleventh six-monthly 
progress report on the implementation of the EU Strategy against 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (2011/I), 13132/11, 
Brussels, 20 July 2011, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/11/
st13/st13132.en11.pdf>.
17  Commission Decision 2010/49/EC of 30 Nov. 2009 determining 
the first regions for the start of operations of the Visa Information 
System (VIS), Official Journal of the European Union, L23, 27 Jan. 2010. 
The date of 11 Oct. 2011 refers to the VIS start of operations in North 
Africa. 
18  Regulation (EC) no. 767/2008 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 9 July 2008 concerning the Visa Information System 
(VIS) and the exchange of data between Member States on short-stay 
visas (VIS Regulation), Official Journal of the European Union, L218, 
13 Aug. 2008.
19  Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2008/633/
JHA of 23 June 2008 concerning access for consultation of the Visa 
Information System (VIS) by designated authorities of Member States 
and by Europol for the purposes of the prevention, detection and 
investigation of terrorist offences and of other serious criminal offences, 
Official Journal of the European Union, L218, 13 Aug. 2008 (entry into 
force 2 Sep. 2008).
20  Council of the European Union, 17080/10 (note 16).
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In order to prevent these risks, unique policies and 
practices for effective administration and enforcement 
are required. According to the Wassenaar Arrangement 
on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and 
Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, attention should 
be paid to (a) determining what constitutes an ITT 
export and when an ITT export occurs; (b) specifying 
in national laws and regulations the intangible 
technology transfers which are subject to export 
control; (c) specifying in national laws and regulations 
that controls on transfers do not apply to information 
in the public domain or to basic scientific research; 
(d) identifying industry, academic institutions and 
individuals in possession of controlled technology 
for targeted outreach efforts; and (e) promoting 
self-regulation by industry and academic institutions 
that possess controlled technology, including by 
assisting them in designing and implementing internal 
compliance programmes and encouraging them to 
appoint export control officers.27
Industry–academia interaction 
The interaction between industry, academia and 
the recipients of technology and know-how can be 
represented in three models.
In model 1, the interaction can be represented in two 
ways: trade interaction or multilateral cooperation. 
In both cases, the activities of industry and academia 
related to ITT cannot be easily separated.
In model 2, ITT takes place in the recipient country, 
through seminars and technical assistance activities, at 
the headquarters of the international organization or in 
third countries.
27  Wassenaar Arrangement, ‘Best Practices For Implementing 
Intangible Transfer Of Technology Controls’, Agreed at the 2006 
Plenary, <http://www.wassenaar.org/guidelines/docs/ITT_Best_
Practices_for_public_statement.pdf>.
the Dual-use e-system to facilitate information 
exchanges concerning export denials among member 
states. Other practical activities have included 
organizing peer visits, working on the development 
of an EU training programme on export controls and 
progressing on the development of EU guidelines.25 
III. ITT CONTROLS AND PROLIFERATION RISKS 
Export control definitions are usually based on 
the status of entities and categorized as industry 
or academia. Industry as a concept includes firms 
and individual brokers, whereas academia includes 
universities and scientific institutions. Industry is 
linked to commercial activities, whereas academia 
is linked to scholarly and scientific activities such as 
training and research. However, a functional approach 
allows for the possibility that both industry and 
academia can undertake commercial transfers in the 
fields of technical assistance, information exchange, 
technology design, know-how development and 
training. In this functional network of interaction, new 
challenges emerge in the form of ITT. There are two 
variations of ITT risks relating to WMD proliferation. 
1. The transfer of knowledge as technical assistance, 
through instruction, for example PhD programmes 
in nuclear physics or microbiology, skills training 
or consulting. This presents significant challenges 
to export controls traditionally based on national 
boundaries. 
2. The transfer of technical data in a non-physical 
form. This includes publicly available encryption 
software, email exchanges of documents related to 
highly sensitive information on the manufacture 
or development of WMD, and consulting on 
the development and deployment of wireless 
telecommunications networks.26 
25  Council of the European Union, 17080/10 (note 15); and Council of 
the European Union, 13132/11 (note 16).
26  Clinton, T., ‘Intangible Technology Transfer and Catch-All 
Controls’, Presentation at the Southeastern Europe Export Control 
Seminar, Szeged, 17–18 June 2003, <http://www.exportcontrol.org/
library/conferences/1379/D2-04-Clinton-ITT.pdf>; and Lopes, A., 
‘Licensing of Intangible Transfers of Technology’, Presentation at the 
Sixth International Export Control Conference, London, 8–10 Nov. 
2004, <http://www.exportcontrol.org/library/conferences/1379/
Licensing_of_Intangible_Tranfers,_Deemed_Export_(Alex_Lopes).
pdf>.
Model 1. Commerical ITT
End-user
Industry
Academia
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of international peace and security: Nuclear non-
proliferation and nuclear disarmament’:
[U]rges all States to take all appropriate national 
measures in accordance with their national 
authorities and legislation, and consistent 
with international law, to prevent proliferation 
financing and shipments, to strengthen export 
controls, to secure sensitive materials, and 
to control access to intangible transfers of 
technology.30
If the above concepts from non-proliferation 
multilateral conventions and relevant resolutions 
were to be merged as part of a review of national 
ITT legislation, it would imply a comprehensive 
approach to visa screening and conceptual changes in 
the definitions of academic activities and ITT. If the 
structure of technical-scientific knowledge in a given 
state is described as a system with inflows (imports 
of ITT and immigration of foreign students, technical 
experts and researchers seeking scientific knowledge) 
and outflows (exports of ITT and emigration of 
national technical experts and scientific researchers 
seeking scientific knowledge abroad), changes in one 
function would probably affect the other one. 
In this regard, a reinforcement of visa-screening 
mechanisms to make a criteria-based selection taking 
into account proliferation concerns is likely to lead to 
reactions from knowledge-recipient countries. These 
‘knowledge importers’ can seek scientific knowledge 
and technical expertise in other countries with lower 
requirements and in international organizations or, if 
they can afford it, they can invite experts and scientists 
to work for them in their territories.
Therefore, visa screening of foreign nationals 
interested in sensitive disciplines and uncontrolled 
30  UN Security Council Resolution 1887, 24 Sep. 2009, para. 27.
In model 3, ITT takes place in an academic context, 
through training and research. 
The international perspective
There are two United Nations Security Council 
resolutions that refer to students and researchers from 
specific countries as a risk for the diversion of sensitive 
ITT. First, UN Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006) 
on Iran:
Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and 
prevent specialized teaching or training of 
Iranian nationals, within their territories or 
by their nationals, of disciplines which would 
contribute to Iran’s proliferation sensitive 
nuclear activities and development of nuclear 
weapon delivery systems.28
Second, UN Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) on 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or 
North Korea): 
Calls upon all Member States to exercise 
vigilance and prevent specialized teaching 
or training of DPRK nationals within their 
territories or by their nationals, of disciplines 
which could contribute to the DPRK’s 
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and 
the development of nuclear weapon delivery 
systems.29
In both cases, the resolutions only refer to students of 
Iran and North Korea being trained in other countries, 
and not to other forms of ITT. Moreover, UN Security 
Council Resolution 1887 (2009) on the ‘Maintenance 
28  UN Security Council Resolution 1737, 23 Dec. 2006, para. 17.
29  UN Security Council Resolution 1874, 12 June 2009, para. 28.
Model 2. ITT in multilateral cooperation
Multilateral 
organization
End-user
Industry
Academia
Model 3. Academic ITT
End-user
(students and 
researchers)
University
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electronic mail or any other electronic means to 
a destination outside the European Community; 
it includes making available in an electronic 
form such software and technology to legal 
and natural persons and partnerships outside 
the Community. Export also applies to oral 
transmission of technology when the technology 
is described over the telephone.34
In this sense, according to Professor Quentin Michel:
[T]he basic principle applying to controls of ITT 
is that the ‘on line’ world should be controlled 
in the same proportionate manner as the ‘off 
line’ world (i.e. when a controlled technology is 
sent in the form of a CD-Rom by post to a third 
country it is subject to authorisation. Therefore 
if the same controlled information . . . is sent by 
e-mail, it should also be controlled). . . . Some EU 
member states grant [a] global licence for ITT, 
which provides a flexible tailor-made instrument 
to avoid undue burden on industries. . . . The 
difficulty with intangible transfer is that border 
controls by customs authorities are not, due to 
the nature of the transfers, possible. Therefore, 
in order to ensure compliance with export 
control regulations, national authorities could 
conduct [an] audit of companies and institutions 
or intercept telecommunications to detect illegal 
transfers of software and technology.35
It should also be noted that the transfer of technology 
taking place through the cross-border movement of 
natural persons is not covered by the regulation.36 It 
is, however, partly covered by Council Joint Action 
CFSP/401/2000.37 Neither the regulation nor the joint 
34  Council of the European Union (note 21), Article 2.2 (iii).
35  Michel (note 33), p. 17. Details of member states’ provisions 
are listed under Article 3.1 of Council Regulation (EC) no. 428/2009 
(note 22).
36  Article 7 of Council Regulation (EC) no. 428/2009 states: ‘This 
Regulation does not apply to the supply of services or the transmission 
of technology if that supply or transmission involves cross-border 
movement of persons’. Nevertheless, the export of technology by an 
intangible means of transfer such as phone, email or fax is covered by 
the regulation. See Council of the European Union (note 21), pp. 5, 45.
37  Council Joint Action 2000/401/CFSP of 22 June 2000 concerning 
the control of technical assistance related to certain military end-uses, 
Official Journal of the European Union, L159, 30 June 2000, pp. 216–217. 
Article 1 considers the transmission of technical assistance by oral 
forms through the cross-border movement of persons. The provisions 
of this joint action complete Article 2(iii) of Council Regulation (EC) 
no. 428/2009 by controlling technical assistance through the movement 
outflows of sensitive knowledge through ITT are 
two sides of the same problem. There is a process of 
symbiosis between industry and academia, beyond 
purely scientific activities, in two dimensions. First, 
there is a growing cooperation between industry and 
academia in the field of research and development, 
fostered by public policies, where they sometimes 
undertake common projects. Second, universities 
and scientific institutions sometimes engage in 
commercial activities based on the outcome of research 
programmes, in which they have invested resources.
The EU approach
The EU recognizes that the establishment of common 
lists of dual-use items, destinations and guidelines 
are essential elements for an effective export control 
regime and, in this context, that the transmission of 
software and technology by means of electronic media 
to destinations outside the Community should also be 
controlled.31
Article 2.1 of Council Regulation 428/2009 
establishes that:
‘[D]ual-use items’ shall mean items, including 
software and technology, which can be used 
for both civil and military purposes, and shall 
include all goods which can be used for both 
non-explosive uses and assisting in any way in 
the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices.32 
The specific items are listed in an annex that is 
updated annually. The list does not grant space 
for member states’ interpretation of whether or 
not an item should be subject to authorization. 
However, if a dual-use item is not listed, it does 
not necessarily mean that it is not subject to 
export authorization—such authorization could 
be required by a national export control list or 
could result from the implementation of a catch-
all clause.33 The term ‘export’ also includes:[The] 
transmission of software or technology by 
electronic media, including by fax, telephone, 
31  Council of the European Union (note 21), paras 7–8 of the 
preamble.
32  Council of the European Union (note 21), Article 2.1.
33  On this issue see the analysis in Michel, Q., The European Union 
Export Control Regime: Comment of the legislation: article-by-article 
(Liege University: Liege, Mar. 2011), p. 7,  <http://local.droit.ulg.ac.be/
sa/uee/admin/file/publi/20110324095344_vademecum-V.2.18.pdf>.
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It was later developed to also include ITT in the form of 
know-how and technical assistance.
ITT through academic activities can fall under 
export control legislation if it is based on technical 
assistance to an end-user beyond the state’s borders. 
Commercial exports of sensitive and dual-use 
technologies and products implying a physical transfer 
need a licence; in this regard, enforcement is ensured 
by police and customs operations.
Commercial exports of sensitive information and 
designs of enabling technologies implying a transfer of 
documents or technical assistance also need a licence; 
enforcement is also ensured by police and customs 
operations, but is more difficult. New information 
technologies make electronic and digital transmissions 
possible anywhere in the world, undercutting the 
enforcement capabilities of customs authorities. In this 
regard, technical assistance in sensitive technologies, 
based on a service contract between supplier and 
recipient, needs to be authorized with a licence. 
Finally, if technical assistance in sensitive 
technologies, based on a service contract between 
supplier and recipient, takes place in the supplier’s 
territory, the recipient needs a licence, and the 
recipient’s representatives might also need a visa in 
accordance with the supplier’s national regulations. In 
this case, visa screening would be a second mechanism 
of control.
The main tool to control ITT in academia is visa 
screening of foreign students and researchers in 
sensitive disciplines, if the training (i.e. the ITT) takes 
place in the supplier’s territory. It is important to 
underline that control is enforced on the movement of 
persons towards the national territory (i.e. immigration 
control) and not on the knowledge transfers or ITT. If 
technical or scientific academic experts of the supplier 
institution undertake the same activities (ITT) abroad, 
no control is implemented.
Taking the above into consideration, several gaps 
or loopholes in the export control and visa-screening 
systems can be identified.
1. In technical assistance activities in the framework 
of international cooperation, the multilateral 
organization can appear to be the recipient of ITT, 
whereas it is only an intermediary or broker for other 
end-users of ITT.
2. Academic activities within training, scientific 
cooperation and seminars on sensitive disciplines in 
the recipient country (where the end-user is based) are 
action cover ITT achieved through the movement of 
foreign citizens into the EU (third country citizens 
taking courses at universities and research centres 
or participating in industry training programmes in 
the EU). Although this does not necessarily mean that 
such ITT is not controlled. It could be governed by 
other policies, such as visa policies, or national security 
objectives outside the scope of the dual-use regulation 
(see model 4).38
EU member states’ national provisions and 
requirements regarding the control of ITT do not 
significantly vary from one state to another. In general, 
both tangible and intangible transfers follow the same 
licensing procedure and member states do not foresee 
specific licence forms for ITT. Further requirements 
are needed in some countries (the Czech Republic, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovenia and 
Sweden), such as an exporter obligation to record each 
transaction during a five-year period. In Germany and 
Finland additional controls have also been introduced 
at domestic level; customs authorities can conduct 
periodic and ad hoc compliance visits or audits at the 
exporter’s site and they have the right to inspect both 
written documents and data processing systems. Some 
member states apply ex-post compliance controls to 
all exporters using global or general authorizations to 
export technology (e.g. the United Kingdom).39
IV. VISA SCREENING AND ITT
Legislation on export controls was originally developed 
for commercial activities undertaken by industry, 
mainly for the export of sensitive and dual-use 
technologies and products implying a physical transfer. 
of persons. ‘Assistance provided by electronic means’ is not included 
in the definition as it is already covered by Article 2(iii). See Michel 
(note 33), p. 21. 
38  Michel (note 33), p. 17.
39  Data based on a table in Michel (note 33), pp. 24–25.
Model 4. ITT control mechanism
End-user
Industry
Export 
controls
Academia
Visa 
screening
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visa-free access to the Schengen Area may follow from 
bilateral negotiations and are usually reciprocal.
Another main element of the common visa policy 
is the EU ‘Visa Code’.43 It sets out the procedures and 
conditions for issuing visas for the purpose of short 
stays and airport transit. Operational instructions for 
the application of the Visa Code are further specified in 
the ‘Handbook for the processing of visa applications 
and the modification of issued visas’ and the ‘Handbook 
for the organisation of visa sections and local Schengen 
cooperation’ (list of annexes).44
Finally, there are three special cases in the general 
EU visa policy that should be mentioned. First, there is 
visa reciprocity with non-EU countries whose nationals 
are exempt from the visa requirement.45 Second, there 
are visa facilitation agreements concluded with nine 
non-EU countries, which facilitate the procedures for 
issuing visas with those countries.46 Third, there is 
43  Regulation (EC) no. 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas 
(Visa Code), Official Journal of the European Union, L243, 15 Sep. 2009. 
Amended by Commission Regulation (EU) no. 977/2011 of 3 Oct. 2011, 
Official Journal of the European Union, L258, 4 Oct. 2011, concerning 
the Visa Information System (VIS) and the exchange of data between 
member states on short-stay visas (VIS Regulation).
44  European Commission, Commission Decision of 19 Mar. 2010 
establishing the Handbook for the processing of visa applications and 
the modification of issued visas, C(2010) 1620 final,  <http://ec.europa.
eu/home-affairs/policies/borders/docs/c_2010_1620_en.pdf>; 
European Commission, Commission Implementing Decision of 4 
August 2011 amending Commission Decision no. C(2010) 1620 final 
of 19 Mar. 2010 establishing the Handbook for the processing of 
visa applications and the modification of issued visas, C(2011) 5501 
final, <http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/doc_centre/borders/docs/
decision/5501/1_EN_ACT_part1_v4.pdf>; and Commission Decision 
of 11 June 2010 establishing the Handbook for the organisation of visa 
sections and local Schengen cooperation, C(2010) 3667 final, <http://
ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/policies/borders/docs/c_2010_3667_
en.pdf>. The Handbook contains guidelines for organizing visa sections 
and local Schengen cooperation. It is to be used for the implementation 
of EU legislation on the common visa policy by member states’ central 
and consular authorities, at central and local level.
45  Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EC) 
no. 851/2005 of 2 June 2005 amending Regulation (EC) no. 539/2001 
listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of 
visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are 
exempt from that requirement as regards the reciprocity mechanism, 
Official Journal of the European Union, L141, 4 June 2005.
46  Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, 
Montenegro, Russia, Serbia and Ukraine. Visa facilitation agreements 
are linked to readmission agreements, which establish the procedures 
for the return to the EU or to the partner non-EU country of persons 
(own and third country nationals or stateless persons) in irregular 
situations. The legal basis for these agreements is Directive 2008/115/
EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 Dec. 2008 on 
common standards and procedures in Member States for returning 
illegally staying third-country nationals, Official Journal of the European 
Union, L348, 21 Dec. 2008, which entered into force at the end of 2010.
not subject to control and visa screening does not apply. 
The freedom of movement of persons and academic 
freedom allow such activities to take place.
3. Individuals with technical and scientific skills, 
either from industry or academia, can be engaged by a 
third country to work in a sensitive technology project. 
In this case, even if such a transaction is not an ‘export’ 
(as it is based on a contract signed in the recipient 
country under national regulations), it is a form of ITT.
4. Digital electronic information technologies make 
it more difficult to control ITT and easier to undercut 
customs enforcement.
Visa-screening mechanisms in the EU 
EU member states, with the exception of Ireland 
and the UK, have a unified visa system as part of the 
Schengen Area.40 Citizens from some non-EU countries 
are required to have a visa when travelling to the 
Schengen Area. The EU has a common list of countries 
whose citizens must have a visa when crossing the 
external borders and a list of countries whose citizens 
are exempt from that requirement. These lists are set 
out in Council Regulation 539/2001 and its successive 
amendments.41 Generally, a short-stay visa issued by a 
Schengen state entitles its holder to travel throughout 
the 25 Schengen states for up to three months within a 
six-month period. Visas for visits exceeding that period 
remain subject to national procedures.42 Decisions on 
40  The Schengen cooperation was incorporated into the EU legal 
framework by the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam (entry into force 1999). 
The Schengen Area currently consists of 26 states, all but 4 of which are 
members of the EU: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. 
It also includes several microstates that maintain open or semi-open 
borders with Schengen countries. Ireland and the UK negotiated 
opt-outs from Schengen and continue to operate systematic border 
controls between themselves and other EU member states. Cyprus 
is legally bound to join the Schengen Area, but fully implementation 
has been delayed due to its territorial disputes. Bulgaria and Romania 
were approved by the European Parliament in June 2011, but rejected 
by the Council of Ministers in Sep. 2011. Before fully implementing 
the Schengen rules, each state needs to have its preparedness assessed 
in four areas: air borders, visas, police cooperation and personal data 
protection. 
41  Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EC) 
no. 539/2001 of 15 Mar. 2001 listing the third countries whose nationals 
must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders 
and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, Official 
Journal of the European Union, L81, 21 Mar. 2001, p. 1. This regulation 
has been amended several times, most recently by Regulation (EU) 
no. 1211/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 Dec. 
2010, Official Journal of the European Union, L339, 22 Dec. 2010.
42  For more information see European Commission, Home Affairs, 
‘Visa policy: common rules for short stays’, 13 Sep. 2011, <http://
ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/policies/borders/borders_visa_en.htm>.
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Information System (SIS).49 Applicants present 
their visa applications and supporting documents 
at EU consular offices. After an initial examination, 
a personal interview might also take place. The 
information requested about an applicant and the 
purpose of his/her trip takes into account immigration 
requirements such as the economic capacity of the 
applicant (economic resources, accommodation, 
travel expenses, income, return ticket, etc.).50 Once 
this administrative procedure has been completed, 
consular officers proceed to the next step: an inquiry 
in the national visa information network, linked to 
the ministries of foreign affairs. If this inquiry shows 
that the applicant’s nationality does not require a SIS 
inquiry, the consular office can issue a visa. If, however, 
the applicant’s nationality makes a SIS inquiry 
mandatory, the office must proceed with a consultation 
(as well as cross-checks in official national registers).
For nationalities that require a consultation, 
consular officers register the applicant’s personal 
data in SIS, where Schengen states then have access 
to the applicant’s records, if any.51 Through ministries 
49  The Schengen Information System (SIS) was set up for the 
purpose of border and police checks, prevention and prosecution 
of crimes, and issuing visas and residence permits. It is a common 
law-enforcement database, containing at present 32 million entries 
provided by the 25 participating states. The number of alerts is rising 
by approximately 3% each month. Member states supply information 
through national networks (N-SIS) that are securely connected to 
a central system (C-SIS). This system is supplemented by a network 
known as Supplementary Information Request at the National Entry 
(SIRENE), which is the human interface of the SIS. Alerts on persons 
can be created in the following instances: (a) if a person is wanted for 
arrest for extradition or surrender purposes (Schengen Convention, 
Art. 95)—the alert in SIS is equivalent to a European Arrest Warrant or 
a request for provisional arrest pursuant to the European Convention 
on Extradition; (b) for the purposes of refusing entry to aliens at the 
Schengen external border, or for expulsion, if located in the Schengen 
territory (Art. 96); (c) as part of a search for missing persons (Art. 97), 
in particular minors; (d) to establish a person’s whereabouts on behalf 
of judicial authorities (Art. 98); and (e) for the purposes of discreet 
surveillance or specific checks (Art. 99). For more information see 
Council of the European Union, SIS, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
policies/council-configurations/justice-et-affaires-interieures-(jai)/
sirene-schengen-information-system/sis.aspx?lang=en>; and Council 
of the European Union, SIRENE-Schengen information system, <http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/policies/council-configurations/justice-
et-affaires-interieures-(jai)/sirene-schengen-information-system.
aspx?lang=en>.
50  For details see Regulation (EC) no. 810/2009 (note 42), 
articles 10–17.
51  ‘Under Article 22 of the Visa Code, a Member State may require 
the central authorities of other Member States to consult its central 
authorities during the examination of visa applications lodged by 
nationals of specific third countries or specific categories of such 
nationals. Such consultation does not apply to applications for airport 
transit visas. . . . When a third country is listed, it means that at least one 
a special regime foreseen for the admission into the 
EU of non-EU nationals for the purposes of scientific 
research, the so-called ‘Scientific Visa Package’.47 The 
Scientific Visa Package facilitates the procedure of 
admitting researchers coming from non-EU countries 
to the EU for the purpose of scientific research. There 
is a distinction in the procedure between long-term 
admission (for researchers intending to stay in the 
EU for more than three months) and short-term 
visas (for entries of less than three months). It should 
be noted that, once awarded a residence permit, a 
researcher can carry out his or her research in the 
country which granted the permit or in another EU 
member state. If a researcher wants to, for example, 
participate in a research conference or carry out part 
of his or her research in another member state for up 
to three months, no new application process needs to 
be made. If the stay is for longer than three months, 
a new hosting agreement needs to be signed with an 
organization in the new country.48 
Visa-screening procedures and WMD proliferation 
concerns
Short-term visas 
Short-term visas or ‘Schengen visas’ allow the holder 
a total stay of up to 90 days in the Schengen territory 
within a period of six months for tourism or business 
purposes. They are granted through the Schengen 
47  The legal basis for the Scientific Visa Package is Council Directive 
2005/71/EC of 12 Oct. 2005 on a specific procedure for admitting third-
country nationals for the purposes of scientific research, Official Journal 
of the European Union, L289, 3 Nov. 2005; Council Recommendation 
2005/762/EC of 12 Oct. 2005 to facilitate the admission of third-country 
nationals to carry out scientific research in the European Community, 
Official Journal of the European Union, L289, 3 Nov. 2005; and 
Recommendation 2005/761/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 28 Sep. 2005 to facilitate the issue by the Member States of 
uniform short-stay visas for researchers from third countries travelling 
within the Community for the purpose of carrying out scientific 
research, Official Journal of the European Union, L289, 3 Nov. 2005.
48  ‘The Scientific Visa Package is available for researchers in public 
and private organisations. Students are not eligible. A researcher is 
defined as: a third-country national holding an appropriate higher 
education qualification which gives access to doctoral programmes, 
and who is selected by a research organisation for carrying out a 
research project for which the above qualification is normally required. 
Individual European countries do not have identical rules of procedure. 
They need to be verified for each country. Please note that the UK and 
Denmark do not participate in the Scientific Visa Package’, European 
Commission, Euraxess, Scientific Visa Package, <http://ec.europa.eu/
euraxess/index.cfm/services/scientificVisa>.
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a long-stay visa for a period of no longer than a year or 
a residence permit for a longer period. A long-stay visa 
is a national visa, but it is issued in accordance with a 
uniform Schengen format. It entitles the holder to enter 
the Schengen Area and remain in the issuing state for a 
period of more than three months but no more than one 
year. If a Schengen state wishes to allow the holder of a 
long-stay visa to remain there for longer than a year, it 
must issue him or her with a residence permit.
The holder of a long-stay visa or a residence permit is 
entitled to move freely within the Schengen Area for a 
period of up to three months in any six-month period.54 
Third-country nationals who are long-term residents 
in a Schengen state can also acquire the right to move 
to and settle in another Schengen state without losing 
their legal status and social benefits.55 
However, some third-country nationals are 
permitted to stay in the Schengen Area for more than 
three months without the need to apply for a long-stay 
visa. Article 20(2) of the Convention implementing the 
Schengen Agreement allows for this ‘in exceptional 
circumstances or in accordance with a bilateral 
agreement concluded before the entry into force of this 
Convention’.56
Long-term visas are an exclusive national 
competence in all EU member states, irrespective of 
their adherence to Schengen. The procedure begins at 
EU member states’ consular offices or in their national 
territories through invitations and expressions of 
interest by firms, academic institutions, legal residents 
or other entities. In Spain the procedure is as follows. 
A foreign citizen must address a preliminary 
request to a firm, institution, university or person 
(legal resident), which determines the status of the 
applicant’s future residence or stay in the hosting 
country: a contract, a training programme, university 
studies, a personal relationship, and so on. Any of the 
entities or persons interested in the immigration of 
54  Regulation (EU) no. 265/2010 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 25 Mar. 2010 amending the Convention Implementing 
the Schengen Agreement and Regulation (EC) no. 562/2006 as regards 
movement of persons with a long-stay visa, Official Journal of the 
European Union, L85, 31 Mar. 2010, p. 1.
55  Council Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-
country nationals who are long-term residents, Official Journal of the 
European Union, L16, 23 Jan. 2004, p. 44.
56  The Schengen acquis: Convention implementing the Schengen 
Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of 
the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common 
borders, Official Journal of the European Union, L239, 22 Sep. 2000, 
pp. 19–62.
of home affairs and the consular departments of 
ministries of foreign affairs, states can use the 
Schengen Consultation Network (VISION) to 
communicate, exchange information and issue denials 
regarding visas.52 Once a denial has been issued by a 
Schengen state, a visa has to be denied to the applicant 
by any other Schengen state. Some categories of 
persons are also subject to prior consultation.53 If there 
is no denial through SIS, the visa application can be 
approved and the visa issued. States that are not part 
of the Schengen Area issue short-term visas through 
national procedures, without interstate inquiries or 
exchange of information. As in Schengen states, visa 
screening is based on interaction between consular 
offices, ministries of foreign affairs and ministries of 
home affairs.
Short-term visa-screening procedures mainly 
address the risks of illegal immigration, terrorism and 
crime; WMD proliferation risks are not considered in 
procedures to grant short-term visas. Therefore, it is 
necessary to increase consular vigilance to also prevent 
transfers of knowledge and know-how. Ministries 
of home affairs have access to personal data on visa 
applicants, but may not be fully aware of the risks of 
ITT. If made aware of WMD proliferation risks, home 
affairs departments and consular offices could play 
major roles in enhancing consular vigilance regarding 
ITT. 
Long-term visas: the Spanish case
For stays in the Schengen Area which exceed three 
months, a third-country national needs to have either 
Member State requires such prior consultation’, European Commission, 
Annex 16 of the Handbook for the processing of visa applications 
and the modification of issued visas, 1 Feb. 2012. The third countries 
listed are: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Belarus, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, North 
Korea, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, 
Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, 
Tunisia, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam and Yemen. 
52  The Schengen Consultation Network (VISION) was established 
to allow consultation among the central authorities of the Schengen 
states for visa applications made by nationals from countries of concern. 
Such consultations are carried out by means of electronic forms when 
needed. Once the Visa Information System (VIS) is fully operational, the 
technical functionalities of VISION will be integrated into VIS. Council 
of the European Union, Council conclusions on the development of the 
Visa Information System (VIS), 19 Feb. 2004, <http://ec.europa.eu/
home-affairs/news/consulting_public/0018/council_conclusions_
final_200204_en.pdf>.
53  The categories of persons subject to prior consultation are: 
Palestinians, refugees and stateless persons. European Commission, 
Annex 16 of the Handbook for the processing of visa applications and the 
modification of issued visas, 1 Feb. 2012.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: 
PROPOSALS TO ENHANCE THE EU VISA-
SCREENING SYSTEM
In conclusion, visa-screening procedures in the EU are 
based on a multilayered scheme of interaction between 
peripheral consular offices, consular departments 
of ministries of foreign affairs and departments of 
ministries of home affairs—and in some cases between 
EU member states. This mechanism implies at least 
three stages of control—local, ministry of foreign 
affairs and ministry of home affairs—in each country. 
However, the information required from applicants 
and the decisions made are based mainly on economic 
capacity and crime prevention criteria. Taking into 
consideration the gaps and loopholes in the system, 
several proposals can be made.
Increasing consular vigilance
Proliferation-related activities can only be considered 
as criminal acts if a serious intention to help terrorist 
groups or contribute to the development of WMD is 
clearly stated, yet by enhancing consular vigilance, 
states are in a better position to prevent proliferation-
related ITT. Exercising vigilance through formal 
procedures, based on legal means, is essential in 
preventing the proliferation of technologies, materials 
and know-how related to WMD to countries of 
concern. Therefore, such consular vigilance focused 
on ITT should be increased. While the definition of 
‘countries of concern’ may be a subject of controversy, it 
is obvious that consular vigilance is an obligation under 
the UN Security Council resolutions on Iran and North 
Korea. 
Some EU member states which receive a high number 
of foreign students, such as the UK, have developed 
national consular vigilance procedures that could serve 
as interesting models for other countries. In the British 
system, all foreign students (except EU/EEA nationals) 
must apply for and receive non-proliferation clearance 
before they can apply for a student visa. Two specific 
factors, namely the visa applicant’s nationality and the 
suggested field of scientific activity, can be grounds for 
closer scrutiny.
It would be also useful if member states notified 
each other of visa denials based on proliferation risks 
(as is the case now for export control denials). In 2009 
France prepared a questionnaire to identify existing 
national measures to exercise consular and scientific 
the applicant must then address a request to the home 
affairs office in the province of future residence or stay. 
The local home affairs office makes inquiries about 
the applicant and also about the entity or person 
inviting him or her. After making inquiries, it decides 
whether to accept or reject the host or contractor’s 
request. If the request is accepted, the applicant and 
relevant consular office are notified. A certificate of 
acceptance is then issued, which is included in the 
applicant’s file.
Once a certificate of acceptance has been issued, the 
applicant presents his or her application to a consular 
office, backed by the host’s expression of interest 
(contract, letter of invitation, enrolment in studies at 
an officially recognized academic institution, etc.). 
The application and supporting documents are then 
examined by the consular office and, if necessary, 
a personal interview takes place. The information 
requested about the applicant and the purpose of his or 
her trip takes into account immigration requirements, 
which are based on the economic capacity of the 
applicant to settle abroad. Once this procedure has 
been completed, the consular officers can proceed to 
the final step: to issue or deny a long-term visa.57 
As is the case with short-term visas, long-term visa-
screening procedures mainly address the risks of illegal 
immigration, terrorism and crime—WMD proliferation 
concerns are not considered among the granting 
criteria for long-term visas. Since local home affairs 
offices play a major role in long-term visa screening and 
have access to information on visa applicants before 
they request visas in consular offices, awareness of 
WMD proliferation risks at both local home affairs 
offices and consular offices abroad is crucial to 
enhancing consular vigilance. 
57  The Spanish legislation on this matter is based on: Organic Law 
4/2000 of 11 June 2000 on the rights and freedoms of foreigners in 
Spain and their social integration, BOE no. 10, 12 Jan. 2000, and its 
amendment by Organic Law 10/2011 of 27 July 2011, BOE no. 180, 28 July 
2011; Royal Decree 557/2011 of 20 Apr. 2011 approving the Regulation of 
Organic Law 4/2000 on the rights and freedoms of foreign nationals in 
Spain and their social integration, following its amendment by Organic 
Law 2/2009, BOE no. 103, 30 Apr. 2011; Royal Decree 240/2007 of 16 
Feb. 2007, which is a transposition of European Directive 2004/38/EC 
to Spanish legislation, BOE no. 51, 28 Feb. 2007; Order PRE/1282/2007 
of 10 May 2007, which establishes the economic means that foreigners 
must provide when seeking to enter Spain; and Order PRE/1283/2007 of 
10 May 2007, which establishes the terms and requirements for the issue 
of a letter of invitation by an individual in favour of a foreigner seeking 
to enter Spain, BOE no. 113, 11 May 2007.
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Iran and North Korea through long-stay visas. The 
information exchange mechanism above can be used 
to vet foreign post graduate students in sensitive 
disciplines in three ways. First, Schengen states 
can consult SIS when processing visa applications 
in accordance with articles 96–100 of the Schengen 
Agreement. Second, states can, within the existing 
legal framework (for example, Article 5 of the 
Schengen Border Code), deny a visa based on security 
concerns. Third, most member states have a system 
for monitoring course changes during an international 
student’s enrolment. Foreign students cannot change 
course to one within an area of sensitive training 
within the period of validity of a visa or residence 
permit. If a student has been admitted to study at 
another institute, he or she has to make a new visa 
application. However, each request is examined 
individually and there are no general restrictions in the 
EU on specific studies relevant for WMD programmes. 
Nevertheless, the host institute should inform the 
authorities of a change in a student’s course, in 
accordance with immigration regulations.
To implement an efficient visa-screening procedure at 
national level, it is necessary to develop synergy among 
all the departments or offices involved in the process, 
including in terms of access to relevant information on 
applicants. This is particularly important when taking 
into account the fact that offices’ competence in the 
prevention of illegal immigration, crime prevention 
and non-proliferation are usually different and separate 
from one another, both physically and functionally. 
This functional distance is also greater in states with a 
large and complex administration. Functional bridges 
are therefore required in order to share relevant 
information, improve interaction during assessments 
and make appropriate decisions.
Being granted a visa is not a foreigner’s ‘right’ in 
any country. However, the principle that a person is 
presumed innocent until proven guilty prevails in the 
legal systems of all EU member states. Requirements 
such as having sufficient financial resources to stay in 
a country without engaging in an illegal job or having 
a clean police record are based on objective criteria 
that allow government officials to determine whether 
an applicant qualifies to get a visa or not. A decision 
based on WMD proliferation concerns, on the other 
hand, might be influenced by suspicion rather than 
actual facts. Such concern might be considered a ‘loose 
criterion’ in societies where civil rights are, rightly, 
better rooted than proliferation concerns—especially 
vigilance. The French questionnaire could be taken 
as a model in order to harmonize common national 
procedures on this issue.
Improving visa-screening procedures
EU member states should establish common standard 
criteria to address proliferation risks in visa-screening 
procedures, to the same extent as economic capacity 
and the prevention of common crime are addressed. 
This awareness of proliferation risks should be 
reflected in visa regulations and visa-screening 
procedures. 
It is necessary to fully implement an information 
exchange mechanism between EU member states in 
long-term visa procedures, similar to the existing one 
for short-term visas. 
The consultation system between the national central 
visa authorities should also be put into practice in cases 
of long-term visa refusals due to proliferation risks.58 
Further, the risk of proliferation could be included in 
the EU ‘Visa Code’; until now, no measures have been 
taking to add proliferation as a separate risk category in 
the visa handbooks that are the basis of this code.
In general, EU member states are considering 
developing the procedures for mutual notification 
of visa denials related to proliferation risks. While a 
denial notification procedure based on proliferation 
risks exists within export controls, it does not yet 
exist for visas. Local consular cooperation should be 
used more effectively to exchange information on visa 
applications and visa denials, in accordance with EU 
consular regulations, but ‘proliferation risk’ should be a 
separate category in the procedures for the processing 
of visa applications. For this reason, EU member states 
should be able to issue electronic alerts in SIS in cases 
of proliferation risk, just as for persons engaged in 
terrorist activities.
Education and scientific authorities need to avoid 
cases of academic institutions giving training that 
is sensitive to WMD proliferation to students from 
58  The consultation system uses the VISION network, pursuant 
to Article 22 of the EU Visa Code (see note 51). For details on how it 
works, see Commission Decision 2009/377/EC of 5 May 2009 adopting 
implementing measures for the consultation mechanism and the other 
procedures referred to in Article 16 of Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 
of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the Visa 
Information System (VIS) and the exchange of data between Member 
States on short-stay visas (VIS Regulation) (notified under document 
number C [2009]2359), Official Journal of the European Union, L117, 
12 May 2009, pp. 0003–0007.
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scientists on proliferation-related issues but there are 
different opinions on the possibility of establishing 
such codes. The responsibility for maintaining good 
scientific practice rests primarily with the research 
organizations.
In order to facilitate scientific vigilance, in 2009 EU 
member states prepared a list of sensitive disciplines 
which are relevant to nuclear weapon and fissile 
material production, missiles and other delivery 
systems, chemical warfare and biological warfare. 
Consular officials could use this list when deciding on 
visa applications from countries of special concern. 
Universities and government officials could also use 
it when deciding whether research fellows from a 
particular country should have access to a sensitive 
research facility or laboratory, or be able to take part 
in a particular technical assistance visit or training 
activity in both industry- and academia-related 
applications. Further, the European Commission 
could use this list of sensitive disciplines in its the 
EU programmes with third countries (e.g. Erasmus 
Mundus). In some EU member states, prior 
consultation with or even prior authorization by the 
ministry of foreign affairs is required before accepting 
a scientific or technical cooperation project. 
Other considerations
All the mechanisms mentioned above are important 
tools in contributing to the non-proliferation efforts 
of EU member states. However, it should be stressed 
that these mechanisms are not homogeneous. 
Some elements are common to Schengen states, but 
other elements are not. In this regard, it should be 
acknowledged that some EU member states have not 
yet developed tools applicable to the non-proliferation 
criteria.
Moreover, while monitoring academic and research 
institutions, exercising appropriate visa screening 
and raising awareness in the scientific community are 
necessary elements of a consolidated non-proliferation 
strategy, attention should also be paid to other aspects 
of ITT. This approach casts light on the limited added 
value of research focused only on visa screening. 
First of all, the mechanisms mentioned above are 
applicable to activities taking place in EU member 
states’ territories, and therefore under national law. 
Second, visa screening is only applicable to requests by 
foreign citizens. Freedom of movement of EU citizens 
allows them to travel abroad without hindrance, for a 
if applicants are classified and discriminated against 
on the basis of their nationalities. Only UN Security 
Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1874 (2009) offer 
tools to help make such decisions and this problem 
poses a serious challenge in EU member states.
Raising awareness in scientific communities
The EU should also raise awareness about the risks 
of WMD proliferation within scientific and academic 
circles and financial institutions. Most of the actors 
involved in the production and trade of dual-use 
and sensitive material are not only well aware of the 
risks and apply the laws, they also put into practice 
preventive mechanisms of physical protection, 
internal control, final user, final destination of the 
product, and so on. Therefore, only a small number of 
actors intentionally work outside of the legal controls. 
Member states should make greater efforts to raise 
awareness among different actors and exchange best 
practices. There is also the need for an enhanced 
awareness of what counts as ‘proliferation criteria’. 
Guidelines on this issue, in the form of the ‘Outreach 
to industry checklist’, were agreed at EU level in 
2005. These guidelines need to be implemented and 
developed further.
In academic and scientific circles, the objective 
should not be to restrict academic freedom and the 
autonomy of universities and research institutes, 
but to make sure that these actors are fully aware 
of the risks related to their activities, via seminars, 
conferences, publications and so on. It would be useful 
to draft handbooks and newsletters with guidance 
and information based on proliferation concerns, 
respecting professional ethic codes. Direct contact 
with relevant scientific institutions and persons on 
problems related to proliferation risks should also 
remain a central element of national plans to raise 
awareness in academia and the scientific community. 
Although awareness-raising programmes are common 
practice in the EU, some member states have not yet 
taken specific measures in this respect. 
In most EU member states, universities are not 
obliged to submit scientific and technical cooperation 
projects to an authority for prior approval. However, 
in some countries (like the UK) universities and 
research institutes have a legal obligation to submit 
scientific and technical cooperation programmes with 
certain countries for prior authorization. Codes of 
conduct could be a useful in raising awareness among 
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short stay or to live and work in other countries, taking 
with them their technical expertise. Third, it should be 
expected that the more efficient these mechanisms are, 
the more necessary it will be for proliferators to engage 
with growing interest in other activities related to ITT. 
Communication via email and the Internet is a clear 
example. In this regard, it is obvious that proliferators 
are already seeking the cooperation of foreign citizens 
living with residence permits in EU member states as 
well as with EU citizens. 
Proliferation trends and procedures are dynamic, 
in constant evolution, adapting to new scenarios to 
attain desired goals. Among these new scenarios, 
the existence of new and emerging suppliers of 
sensitive and dual-use technology that can be used 
in WMD programmes should be recognized. For 
this reason, the prevention of proliferation-related 
activities also requires clear and updated laws and 
regulations, updated trigger lists of dual-use items, a 
solid awareness of proliferation risks and an adequate 
strategy to prevent the risk of diversion. When 
updating non-proliferation strategies, it should be 
possible to amend both national and EU regulations 
without renouncing the principles attached to 
individual identity and reflected in basic civil rights.
ABBREVIATIONS
CBRN Chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear
CODUN Working Party on Global Disarmament 
and Arms Control
CONOP Working Party on Non-Proliferation
EU European Union
ITT Intangible transfer(s) of technology
SIS Schengen Information System
VIS Visa information system
WMD Weapon(s) of mass destruction
A EUROPEAN NETWORK
In July 2010 the Council of the European Union decided to 
create a network bringing together foreign policy 
institutions and research centres from across the EU to 
encourage political and security-related dialogue and the 
long-term discussion of measures to combat the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and 
their delivery systems.
STRUCTURE
The EU Non-Proliferation Consortium is managed jointly 
by four institutes entrusted with the project, in close 
cooperation with the representative of the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy. The four institutes are the Fondation pour 
la recherche stratégique (FRS) in Paris, the Peace Research 
Institute in Frankfurt (PRIF), the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, and Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The 
Consortium began its work in January 2011 and forms the 
core of a wider network of European non-proliferation 
think tanks and research centres which will be closely 
associated with the activities of the Consortium.
MISSION
The main aim of the network of independent non-
proliferation think tanks is to encourage discussion of 
measures to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and their delivery systems within civil society, 
particularly among experts, researchers and academics. 
The scope of activities shall also cover issues related to 
conventional weapons. The fruits of the network 
discussions can be submitted in the form of reports and 
recommendations to the responsible officials within the 
European Union.
It is expected that this network will support EU action to 
counter proliferation. To that end, the network can also 
establish cooperation with specialized institutions and 
research centres in third countries, in particular in those 
with which the EU is conducting specific non-proliferation 
dialogues.
http://www.nonproliferation.eu
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eU NoN-ProliferatioN CoNsortiUm
The European network of independent non-proliferation think tanks
FOUNDATION FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH 
FRS is an independent research centre and the leading 
French think tank on defence and security issues. Its team of 
experts in a variety of fields contributes to the strategic 
debate in France and abroad, and provides unique expertise 
across the board of defence and security studies. 
http://www.frstrategie.org
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE IN FRANKFURT 
PRIF is the largest as well as the oldest peace research 
institute in Germany. PRIF’s work is directed towards 
carrying out research on peace and conflict, with a special 
emphasis on issues of arms control, non-proliferation and 
disarmament.
http://www.hsfk.de
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC 
STUDIES
IISS is an independent centre for research, information and 
debate on the problems of conflict, however caused, that 
have, or potentially have, an important military content. It 
aims to provide the best possible analysis on strategic trends 
and to facilitate contacts. 
http://www.iiss.org/
STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL  
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE
SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to 
research into conflict, armaments, arms control and 
disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, 
analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to 
policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public. 
http://www.sipri.org/
